Abstract

Memories can be accurate or inaccurate. They have, then, accuracy conditions. A reasonable picture of the accuracy conditions of a memory is that a memory is accurate just in case the reference of a memory satisfies the information provided by the memory. But how are the references of our memories determined exactly? And what are the accuracy conditions of memories, given their references? In this paper, I argue that the notion of accuracy conditions for memories is ambiguous. There are two types of conditions which can be plausibly construed as accuracy conditions for memories. I motivate this idea by using some resources from two-dimensional semantics. The outcome of applying two-dimensionalism to memory is that memories have two kinds of accuracy conditions. In both cases, causal relations play an important role in the framing of those conditions. But the role is quite different in each case. For one type of accuracy conditions, the causal relations which produce a memory play the role of fixing the reference of that memory. For the other type of accuracy conditions, the causal relations which produce a memory become part of the information which needs to be satisfied by the reference of the memory for it to be accurate. However, in both cases, the picture according to which a memory is accurate just in case the reference of a memory satisfies the information provided by the memory reemerges as being correct, though for interestingly different reasons.