Analysis of Beliefs Acquired from a Conversational AI: Instruments-based Beliefs, Testimony-based Beliefs, and Technology-based Beliefs

Episteme:1-17 (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Speaking with conversational AIs, technologies whose interfaces enable human-like interaction based on natural language, has become a common phenomenon. During these interactions, people form their beliefs due to the say-so of conversational AIs. In this paper, I consider, and then reject, the concepts of testimony-based beliefs and instrument-based beliefs as suitable for analysis of beliefs acquired from these technologies. I argue that the concept of instrument-based beliefs acknowledges the non-human agency of the source of the belief. However, the analysis focuses on perceiving signs and indicators rather than content expressed in natural language. At the same time, the concept of testimony-based beliefs does refer to natural language propositions, but there is an underlying assumption that the agency of the testifier is human. To fill the lacuna of analyzing belief acquisition from conversational AIs, I suggest a third concept: technology-based beliefs. It acknowledges the non-human agency-status of the originator of the belief. Concurrently, the focus of analysis is on the propositional content that forms the belief. Filling the lacuna enables analysis that considers epistemic, ethical, and social issues of conversational AIs without excluding propositional content or compromising accepted assumptions about the agency of technologies.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,471

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Testimony Amidst Diversity.Max Baker-Hytch - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 183-202.
Communication, Implicature and Testimony.Martina Blečić - 2012 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):69-80.
Is probabilistic evidence a source of knowledge?Ori Friedman & John Turri - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (5):1062-1080.
Group testimony.Deborah Tollefsen - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):299 – 311.
The epistemology of testimony.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):326–348.
Psychological Foundationalism.Robert Audi - 1978 - The Monist 61 (4):592-610.
Problems of sincerity.Richard Moran - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):325-345.
Is Hume really a reductivist?Michael Welbourne - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):407-423.
Problems of sincerity.Richard Moran - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):341–361.
Unconscious Evidence.Jack Lyons - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):243-262.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-03-07

Downloads
61 (#266,190)

6 months
38 (#99,761)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ori Freiman
McMaster University

Citations of this work

Social epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Social epistemology.Alvin Goldman - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Epistemic cultures: how the sciences make knowledge.Karin Knorr-Cetina - 1999 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
The Fate of Knowledge.Helen E. Longino - 2002 - Princeton University Press.

View all 47 references / Add more references