Color Concepts as a Factor of Cognitive Penetration of Perception

Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 59 (2):136-151 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to analyse the influence of linguistic concepts of an agent on the qualitative aspects of her perception. We examine conceptualist and non-conceptualist approaches to the problem of what the content of perceptions is. The conceptualist approach asserts that the content of perception is similar to the content of beliefs: both types of content are assumed to be expressible in language. The non-conceptualist approach to the content of perception assumes that the content of perception cannot be conceptualized due to too much information available to the agent through visual perception. However, the assumption about non-conceptual content of perception leads to some serious difficulties with explaining the phenomenon of cognitive penetration of perception. This is an empirically established fact that some cognitive states may influence on the qualitative aspects of agent’s perception. We show that cognitive penetration of perception implies that perception and those cognitive states which affect it should have comparable content and this mechanism is based on the influence of expectations on perception.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,846

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
Cortical Color and the Cognitive Sciences.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):135-150.
Is Color Experience Cognitively Penetrable?Berit Brogaard & Dimitria E. Gatzia - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):193-214.
Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception.Robert Cowan - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-06-20

Downloads
15 (#946,138)

6 months
8 (#359,856)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references