Anscombe On ‘I’

Philosophical Quarterly 47 (189):507-511 (1997)
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Abstract

I examine the main arguments of Elizabeth Anscombe’s difficult but fecund paper ‘The First Person’. Anscombe argues that the first‐person singular is not a device of reference, and, in particular, that it is not a device of indexical reference. Both arguments fail, but in ways that we can learn from.

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Brian Jonathan Garrett
Kwantlen Polytechnic University

Citations of this work

Re-reading Anscombe on ‘I’.Robert J. Stainton - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):70-93.
Anscombe aurait-elle été relativiste?Marie Guillot - 2012 - RÉPHA, revue étudiante de philosophie analytique 6:55-71.

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