Abstract

This dissertation sets out to discuss some features of Spinoza's concepts of conatus and causation, through a discussion of the overall structure of the Ethics. ;The major portion of the dissertation is devoted to Spinoza's method, as employed in the Ethics, the notorious geometric method. I argue against the traditional reading of the method as a simple geometric device, and for a position which emphasizes how the method itself leads the reader to come to the highest kinds of knowledge. This is accomplished both with reference to Spinoza's early modern contemporaries, and older Jewish antecedent. ;The reconsideration of method leads, respectively, to a discussion of the conatus in Spinoza's philosophy, and the centrality of adequate cause. The conatus is viewed as a way of making Spinoza's philosophy jibe with our phenomenal world, and to show how we express ourselves through the metaphysical, physical and rational structures detailed in the first two books of the Ethics. Hence it allows us to view the work itself as a way of coming to terms with, and moving towards, knowledge sub specie aeternitatis. ;The centrality of adequate cause similarly helps us to see that Spinoza's interest is not so much in detailing the metaphysical structure of the world, but teaching us to express ourselves in and through it. That is the ultimate goal of the method itself