Experience and the World’s Own Language: A Critique of John Mcdowell’s Empiricism

New York: Oxford University Press (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

John McDowell's "minimal empiricism" is one of the most influential and widely discussed doctrines in contemporary philosophy. Richard Gaskin subjects it to careful examination and criticism, arguing that it has unacceptable consequences, and in particular that it mistakenly rules out something we all know to be the case: that infants and non-human animals experience a world. Gaskin traces the errors in McDowell's empiricism to their source, and presents his own, still more minimal, version of empiricism, suggesting that a correct philosophy of language requires us to recognize a sense in which the world we experience speaks its own language.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,283

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
46 (#347,824)

6 months
4 (#798,384)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Richard Gaskin
University of Liverpool

Citations of this work

A plea for non-naturalism as constructionism.Luciano Floridi - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (2):269-285.
Resisting the Disenchantment of Nature: McDowell and the Question of Animal Minds.Carl B. Sachs - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):131-147.
McDowell's Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism.Santiago Echeverri - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):357-386.
Gaskin's ideal unity.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):279-288.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references