Reverse Inference in Neuropsychology

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1139-1153 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Reverse inference in cognitive neuropsychology has been characterized as inference to ‘psychological processes’ from ‘patterns of activation’ revealed by functional magnetic resonance or other scanning techniques. Several arguments have been provided against the possibility. Focusing on Machery’s presentation, we attempt to clarify the issues, rebut the impossibility arguments, and propose and illustrate a strategy for reverse inference. 1 The Problem of Reverse Inference in Cognitive Neuropsychology2 The Arguments2.1 The anti-Bayesian argument3 Patterns of Activation4 Reverse Inference Practiced5 Seek and Ye Shall Find, Maybe6 Conclusion

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,227

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

In Defense of Reverse Inference.Edouard Machery - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (2):251-267.
Philosophical issues in neuroimaging.Colin Klein - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):186-198.
When can non‐commutative statistical inference be Bayesian?Miklós Rédei - 1992 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (2):129-132.
Fodor on global cognition and scientific inference.Sheldon Chow - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):157-178.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-03

Downloads
144 (#130,777)

6 months
25 (#115,808)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Clark Glymour
Carnegie Mellon University

References found in this work

Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:161-186.
Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data?Russell A. Poldrack - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):59-63.
In Defense of Reverse Inference.Edouard Machery - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (2):251-267.
Functional imaging evidence: Some epistemic hotspots.James Bogen - 2001 - In Peter McLaughlin, Peter Machamer & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. Pittsburgh University Press. pp. 173--199.

Add more references