The myth of full belief

Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):164-171 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Belief is typically understood to be the success‐neutral counterpart of knowledge. But there is no success‐neutral counterpart of knowledge.

Categories

Add categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1111/phpe.12185

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Success Semantics and Partial Belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:17-22.
What is “mythic reality”?Robert A. Segal - 2011 - Zygon 46 (3):588-592.
Conceptualism and the New Myth of the Given.Refeng Tang - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):101-122.
Religiopoiesis.Ursula Goodenough - 2000 - Zygon 35 (3):561-566.
Knowledge.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - unknown
Ancestral beliefs in modern cultural and religious practices – The case of the Bapedi tribe.Morakeng E. K. Lebaka - 2019 - HTS Theological Studies 75 (1).
A Note on Jaakko Hintikka's "Knowledge and Belief".Paul Weingartner - 1994 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 49 (1):135-147.
A Note on Jaakko Hintikka's "Knowledge and Belief".Paul Weingartner - 1994 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 49 (1):135-147.
Reflections on knowledge and belief.Simon Bastian Wimmer - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Warwick
More Than Allegory: On religious myth, truth and belief.Bernardo Kastrup - 2016 - Winchester, UK: Iff Books.
Knowledge is normal belief.B. Ball - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):69-76.
True Belief and Knowledge Revisited.John Peterson - 1996 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 52 (1):127-135.
True Belief and Knowledge Revisited.John Peterson - 1996 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 52 (1):127-135.
Why we Believe.Thalos Mariam - 1999 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (2):317-339.
Full Belief and Loose Speech.Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-10-12

Downloads
107 (#165,127)

6 months
34 (#102,495)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jeremy Goodman
Johns Hopkins University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.
Epistemology Normalized.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):89-145.
Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology.Sven Rosenkranz - 2021 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.

View all 11 references / Add more references