Why Do Things Exist and Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?

Open Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):352-373 (2024)
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Abstract

An age-old proposal that to be is to be a unity, or what I call a grouping, is updated and applied to the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” (WSRTN). I propose the straight-forward idea that a thing exists if it is a grouping which ties zero or more things together into a new unit whole and existent entity. A grouping is visually manifested as the surface, or boundary, of the thing. In regard to WSRTN, when we subtract away all existent entities, including the mind of the thinker, the resulting situation that we usually call “nothing would, by its very nature, be the whole amount, or entirety, of the situation. It completely defines the situation. The inherent nature of “nothing” is that it’s everything. Is there anything else besides that “nothing”? No. It is “nothing”, and this “nothing” is it, the all. A whole amount/entirety/all is a grouping, meaning that “nothing” is itself an existent entity. One objection might be that being a grouping is a property so how can it be there in “nothing”? The answer is that it is only once all known existent entities, including all properties and the mind visualizing this, are removed does this “nothing” gain the entirety/all grouping property. Therefore, the very lack of all existent entities is itself what allows this new property to be present and thereby to allow “nothing” to be an existent entity. This entirety/all grouping property is inherent, or intrinsic, to “nothing” and cannot be removed to get a more pure “nothing”. While the idea that “nothing” is a “something” that exists necessarily isn’t new, the grouping, or any, mechanism for how this can be so is.

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