On Problem-References

ProtoSociology 38:279-295 (2021)
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Abstract

The book under review treats sociology as a science that identifies and reconceptualizes problems already defined by others. Such definitions are viewed to be dependent on conditions that the book calls “membership orders”. The book argues that the sociological observer should look for and observe from the boundaries that keep “members” and “non-members”, along with their corresponding views of problems, apart. The review essay approaches the book with the dual question, “Who describes the reality in which it is determined that social situations are treated as problematic by those involved?” And “Who determines whose problem is the problem considered relevant in each case?” The essay discusses the answers given by the authors to these questions with the help of their conceptualization, data, and object constitution. Similarities and differences are highlighted in comparison with Luhmann’s theory. For illustration purposes, the authors’ theory is applied to law.

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