Conceptual Centrality and Implicit Bias

Mind and Language 33 (1):95-111 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

How are biases encoded in our representations of social categories? Philosophical and empirical discussions of implicit bias overwhelmingly focus on salient or statistical associations between target features and representations of social categories. These are the sorts of associations probed by the Implicit Association Test and various priming tasks. In this paper, we argue that these discussions systematically overlook an alternative way in which biases are encoded, that is, in the dependency networks that are part of our representations of social categories. Dependency networks encode information about how features in a conceptual representation depend on each other. This information determines the degree of centrality of a feature for a conceptual representation. Importantly, centrally encoded biases systematically disassociate from those encoded in salient-statistical associations. Furthermore, the degree of centrality of a feature determines its cross-contextual stability: in general, the more central a feature is for a concept, the more likely it is to survive into a wide array of cognitive tasks involving that concept. Accordingly, implicit biases that are encoded in the central features of concepts are predicted to be more resilient across different tasks and contexts. As a result, the distinction between centrally encoded and salient-statistical biases has important theoretical and practical implications.

Similar books and articles

Beliefs and biases.Shannon Spaulding - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7575-7594.
The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias.Jules Holroyd & Joseph Sweetman - 2016 - In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Mather Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Bias and Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2020 - In Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 99-115.
Implicit bias: a sin of omission?Marie Https://Orcidorg van Loon - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):325-336.
Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Jules Holroyd - 2012 - Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):274-306.
Bias and Knowledge: Two Metaphors.Erin Beeghly - 2020 - In Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 77-98.
Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias.Lindsay Rettler & Bradley Rettler - 2020 - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. pp. 125-145.
Biased by our imaginings.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (5):627-647.
Two flaws concerning belief accounts of implicit biases.Baston Rene - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):352-367.
Cognition and the Structure of Bias.Gabbrielle Johnson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-08-11

Downloads
403 (#50,009)

6 months
137 (#27,159)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Guillermo Del Pinal
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Shannon Spaulding
Oklahoma State University

Citations of this work

Oppressive Things.Shen-yi Liao & Bryce Huebner - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):92-113.
Engineering Social Concepts: Feasibility and Causal Models.Eleonore Neufeld - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
The Structure of Bias.Gabbrielle M. Johnson - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1193-1236.
Implicit bias and social schema: a transactive memory approach.Valerie Soon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1857-1877.
Biased by our imaginings.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (5):627-647.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
The origin of concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Doing without concepts.Edouard Machery - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 32 references / Add more references