Abstract
This paper restates my argument that certain forms of liberalism can and should accept a non-instrumental perspective on the natural world. This perspective is unpacked in terms of ‘respect for nature’s otherness’. Liberalism is represented by Rawlsian political liberalism. I claim there are important congruencies between respect for nature’s otherness and the ‘reasonableness’ involved in political liberalism, such that the latter should incorporate the former. Following a suggestion of B. Baxter I reconsider these congruencies with particular emphasis on the roles of toleration and integrity. I also explain further why I think it arbitrary, rather than logically inconsistent, of the political liberal to exclude respect for nature’s otherness from her conception of the political. Finally I argue that insofar as liberalism embraces ecological justice on the basis of the considerability of non-human interests, it cannot consistently exclude respect for nature’s otherness.