Simulation and cognitive penetrability

Mind and Language 11 (1):44-67 (1996)
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Abstract

: Stich, Nichols et al. assert that the process of deriving predictions by simulation must be cognitively impenetrable. Hence, they claim, the occurrence of certain errors in prediction provides empirical evidence against simulation theory. But it is false that simulation‐derived prediction must be cognitively impenetrable. Moreover the errors they cite, which are instances of irrationality, are not evidence against the version of simulation theory that takes the central domain of simulation to be intelligible transitions between states with content

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Jane Heal
Cambridge University

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References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Action, Emotion And Will.Anthony Kenny - 1963 - Ny: Humanities Press.
Folk psychology as simulation.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.

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