Abstract

In this dissertation I attempt to defend what I call the Kantian position concerning the relationship between moral considerations and reasons for action. The Kantian position holds that moral considerations are intersubjective, and that moral considerations are necessarily reasons for action. The Kantian position has recently been attacked by Philippa Foot and Bernard Williams among others. I call their position the prudentialist position. While agreeing with the Kantian position that moral considerations are intersubjective, the prudentialist holds that only prudential considerations are necessarily reasons for action, and that moral considerations are only contingently reasons for action. In Chapter One I attempt to articulate why the prudentialist holds that prudential but not moral considerations are necessarily reasons for action. The reason, I argue, is that the prudentialist holds that a practical consideration becomes a reason for action for an agent only if it provides him with motivation. Since the sorts of things that provide an agent with motivation are his own interests and desires, prudential considerations are necessarily reasons for action. Moral considerations, on the other hand, will provide an agent with motivation only if he happens to care about others. Thus moral considerations are only contingently reasons for action. I point out, however, that the prudentialist view concerning the relationship between reasons for action and motivation is only one of at least two possible views. I call it an "internalist" view. Such a view holds that any analysis of the concept "reason for action" must make reference to the motivations of the agent said to have a reason. The Kantian, I argue, could adopt an "externalist" account of reasons for action. An externalist account holds that no reference to the motivations of the agent said to have a reason need be made in the analysis of the concept "reason for action". On this view the fact that an agent failed to be moved by a particular consideration would not count against its being a reason for action. ;After making this distinction I articulate the procedure I use to provide the Kantian with a response to the prudentialist position. The procedure consists of challenging each view to explicate the type of necessity that might be appealed to in defending the claim that moral/prudential considerations are necessarily reasons for action. In Chapter Two I consider the possibility of both views using logical necessity to defend their claims. I argue that since each view holds a different account of the meaning of the phrase "reason for action" any attempt to defend their claims using logical necessity will result in each begging the question against the other. In Chapter Three, using some of the recent literature on sociobiology, I consider whether either view could use causal necessity to defend their claims. I argue that causal necessity will not do because it would involve giving up the normative force of the claims in question. Finally, in Chapter Four I develop a sense of necessity I call "pragmatic necessity". A practical consideration is said to be pragmatically necessary if ignoring it as a reason for action will adversely affect an agent's life. In Chapter Five, by reviewing the personality theories of Freud, Adler, Fromm, and Laing, I argue that ignoring either moral or prudential considerations as reasons for action will result in significant psychological costs to an agent. I conclude, then, that both moral and prudential considerations are pragmatically necessarily reasons for action