Agency and causal explanation

In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action. New York: Oxford University Press (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I. There are two points of view: ___ From the personal point of view, an action is a person's doing something for a reason, and her doing it is found intelligible when we know the reason that led her to it. ___ From the impersonal point of view, an action would be a link in a causal chain that could be viewed without paying any attention to people, the links being understood by reference to the world's causal workings

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,654

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Mental causation: Sustaining and dynamic.Robert N. Audi - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
Laws, causality and the intentional explanation of action.Zhu Xu - 2010 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2):280-293.
Agency, ownership, and the standard theory.Markus E. Schlosser - 2010 - In Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New waves in philosophy of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 13-31.
Internalising practical reasons.Rowland Stout - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):229–243.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
277 (#74,950)

6 months
24 (#121,449)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jennifer Hornsby
Birkbeck College

Citations of this work

A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons.Jennifer Hornsby - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Action and Agency in Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Critique.Justin Nnaemeka Onyeukaziri - 2023 - Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy (Philippine e-journal) 24 (1):73-90.
Substances, Agents and Processes.Helen Steward - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (1):41-61.
Reasons and psychological causes.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.

View all 26 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references