Abstract

Chapter 1 concerns the role non-linguistic contextual factors play in the expression of thought. It is argued that contextual factors play a role in determining what is expressed by predicates. Several strategies for avoiding this conclusion are discussed and rejected. One strategy maintains that contextual factors determine, not what is expressed, but only what is otherwise communicated. Another contends that whatever can be expressed context dependently can also be expressed context independently. The chapter concludes by suggesting that context dependence indicates that attempts to analyze thought and thinking in terms of linguistic facts alone may not succeed. ;Chapter 2 considers an argument for the view that understanding a sentence that expresses a necessary truth suffices to determine its truth value. The argument maintains, first, that understanding a sentence involves meta-linguistic knowledge of its referential and truth conditional properties, and, second, that such knowledge suffices to determine the truth value of a sentence that expresses a necessary truth. It is argued that while a strong reading of the argument's first premise is false a weak, though possibly true, reading renders the argument invalid. Various defences for the argument's second premise are then considered and rejected, and two arguments against it are presented. ;Chapter 3 is an examination of two strands in Gottlob Frege views on the analysis of Sense. Frege held that the analysis of Sense plays a crucial role in the development of both the natural sciences as well as the sciences of arithmetic and logic, and he held that the analysis of Sense yields improved understanding of Sense. Frege thus viewed foundational scientific insight as continuous with conceptual clarification. Several aspects of these strands are discussed. The chapter concludes by speculating about what these views on analysis suggest about Frege's conception of understanding