Warrant, defeaters, and the epistemic basis of religious belief

In Michael G. Parker and Thomas M. Schmidt (ed.), Scientific explanation and religious belief. Mohr Siebeck. pp. 81-98 (2005)
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Abstract

I critically examine two features of Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology. (i) If basic theistic beliefs are threatened by defeaters (of various kinds) and thus must be defended by higher-order defeaters in order to remain rational and warranted, are they still “properly basic”? (ii) Does Plantinga’s overall account offer an argument that basic theistic beliefs actually are warranted? I answer both questions in the negative.

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Christoph Jäger
University of Innsbruck

Citations of this work

Defeasibility Theory.Thomas Grundmann - 2011 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 156-166.

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