Reasoning and representing

Philosophical Studies 105 (2):129-160 (2001)
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Abstract

I argue that logical understanding is not propositional knowledgebut is rather a species of practical knowledge. I further arguethat given the best explanation of logical understanding someversion or another of inferential role semantics must be the correct account of the determinants of logical content

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Mark Eli Kalderon
University College London

Citations of this work

References.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 361-386.
Meaning as an inferential role.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (1):1-35.
XIII—Knowing How to Reason Logically.Corine Besson - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121 (3):327-353.
Meaning and inference.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2003 - In Timothy Childers & Ondrej Majer (eds.), Logica Yearbook 2002. Filosofia.

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References found in this work

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.

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