Abstract

It is remarkable that the phenomenological tradition always treated Husserl’s concept of kinesthesis as instrumental, and extremely rarely as a primary topic. For this reason, Husserl’s own confusion regarding this concept has not been addressed properly. According to Dorion Cairns, in early July 1932 Husserl reversed his concept of kinesthesis several times. Moreover, Husserl’s accounts provided in the Ding und Raum lectures of 1907 and Ideas II are different in this regard. Husserl’s late manuscripts also provide evidence for his updated approach to kinesthesis in the 1930s. The aim of this chapter is to present this wavering by Husserl in more detail and to understand the reasons for these “mutations.” Consequently, a sharp line of distinction is drawn between “proprioception” and “kinesthesis.” Following Husserl, kinesthetic self-awareness is attached to the activity of the ego rather than corporeal sensitivity. Of course, corporeal configurations and locomotions are enactments of the kinesthetic self. Moreover, noeses, decisions, habits, recollections, and phantasies are also enactments of the kinesthetic self. The kinesthetic self encompasses all domains of the lifeworld in one kinesthetic style.