Abstract

Husserl claims to attain objective knowledge of any ego whatever by using a phantasy-ideation procedure. He interprets the objection of solipsism as attacking this claim, and hence the validity of phenomenological psychology. In the fifth meditation Husserl defends the claim to objective knowledge of other egos with a dialectical investigation. He reveals what the claim presupposes, and shows that the "psychological theory of empathy" ultimately entails a "transcendental theory of empathy." The "abstraction to ownness" is treated as a starting point for the dialectical investigation into the significance of both the product--the ownness-essence--and the method through which it is attained. The morphological nature of the ownness-essence is clarified, and the eidetic method is supported as providing knowledge of any ego whatever. ;This thesis is defended by emphasizing a two-fold nature of the eidetic method. It both clarifies an essence and marks a starting point for dialectical investigations. The two-fold nature of the method is developed by tracing its heritage to Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Mind. Descartes' dialectical procedure--"universal method of learning"--is distinguished from his natural scientific methodology--"mathesis universalis." These two procedures are demonstrated as moments of Husserl's eidetic method, albeit with the important qualification that Husserl modifies the symbolic function of the imagination. Husserl's "phantasy variation" is treated at length to clarify the role of the imagination in the eidetic method. Ultimately, it is demonstrated that Husserl in the fifth meditation employs a "variation of essences" to justify the claim that the essences attained by phantasy of particular experiences are essences of any possible ego