Abstract

Gottlob Frege is the single most important figure in the development of modern mathematical logic, and is recognized as a founder of analytical philosophy. The primary aim of this work is to articulate the philosophical basis of Frege's logic and logical theory. I argue that the most general forces which animate Frege's work are neither Kantian, as is sometimes maintained, nor congenial to the semantical outlook on logic which has since Frege's time become standard. These forces are most conspicuous in Frege's conception of the nature of objectivity; historically, it agrees in essential respects with pre-Kantian enlightenment Rationalism. A great deal of space is devoted to showing the influence of this philosophy on the particulars of Frege's logical theory, and to a general criticism which culminates in a comparison with Wittgenstein's Tractatus; the work concludes with an extended discussion of the nature and significance of logicism as Frege conceived it, and a diagnosis of its failure in that light. Frege is a founder of analytical philosophy, but, as I argue, his most basic commitments have rarely been properly acknowledged, and some are actually deeply inimical to analytical philosophy as currently practiced. An ulterior aim of the work is to awaken a desire for a more explicit reckoning and evaluation of the most basic presuppositions of contemporary analytical philosophy