Abstract

The idea of phenomenology seeks to revive the position of philosophy as the first and foundational knowledge. By referring to Descartes, Husserl tries to introduce philosophy as a broad and responsible knowledge about to other sciences, and for this reason, he considers mathematical and natural sciences to be related to philosophy in their foundations and principles, and claims that philosophy is a necessary and inherent Precedence over natural knowledge. In this regard, examining the quality and how the exact sciences depend on phenomenology is a theme that can be traced in some of Husserl’s works. Although these topics in contemporary philosophy have never been widely considered by phenomenologists and interpreters of Husserl’s opinions, in recent decades and influenced by some conflicts in the “philosophy of science”, the rereading of this neglected aspect of phenomenological thinking has been given attention. In the current research, focusing on Husserl’s medieval thought, which is known as “transcendental phenomenology”, I have tried to provide a macro- framework for the philosophical asse”sment of physics knowledge. In the first chapter, a historical introduction is given,”during which the unique advantages and possibilities that exist in Husserl’s intellectual heritage for discussing the foundations of mathematical physics will be explained. In the second chapter, in two separate axes, the general relationship between philosophy and science is discussed from a phenomenological point of view. In the first axis, while re-reading Husserl’s perception of “natural thesis” and his proposed path for transitioning from this situation through the actions of “phenomenological Epoche”, I will explain how phenomenology Precedence over the exact sciences through redefining the entire range of knowledge attainable for humans as relations and verbs of Transcendental Ego. In the second axis, by reviewing the treatise on logical Investigations, Husserl’s fundamentalist view of ideatic sciences is examined, and in the next step, the basic distinction between the laws of mathematical physics and the above sciences is discussed, and thus, it will be clear that in Husserl’s view, the laws of natural sciences and empirical, they do not have the mastery and necessity and generality of ideatic sciences and have an estimated and approximate nature. In the thi’d chapter, focusing on the challenge of theoretical and unobservable identities, I will reread ’usserl's opinions in ideas 1 about the identity of the object determined by physical concepts with the Common perceptual object, and I will try to complete his theory by referring to the basic components of phenomenological epistemology. Referring to the idea of categorical intuition and discussing the quality of constitue of Universals will be the main pillar of this effort. I will argue that theoretical identities are Universals whose calendar involves a primary imaginary givenness, and this Universality, in the sense intended by Husserl, is a Kantian Universality (geometric and ideal essence) and not a Platonic Universality (an imprecise Universality). In the second half of this chapter, I will critically examine the interpretation of Husserl’s theories in the context of the philosophy of science and their registration under the realist-instrumentalist dichotomy, and by drawing a framework based on the principles of phenomenology to discuss reality and existence in the realm of material nature, I discuss about the laws of physics. For this purpose, it is necessary to reflect on the transition of phenomenology from a theory of knowledge to ontology and to explain the development of “transcendental idealism” based on the idea of phenomenology. In the final chapter, while rereading three basic challenges in the contemporary philosophy of science, each of which is an obstacle to the realistic acceptance of scientific laws, I will examine the possibilities available in Husserl’s philosophical science to overcome these bottlenecks. Pessimistic meta-induction, Underdetermination of Theory by Date and historical constructionism about science and doubts about the existence of “progress” in the history of science are three axes that, while examining them, put the theory that was formed in the previous two chapters about the phenomenological reality of the laws of physics to the test. I will show some of its advantages and limitations.