Abstract

In the paper I examine Collingwood’s historical metaphysics, i.e., the fusion Collingwood attempts between history and philosophy. Collingwood’s metaphysical analysis aims to identify and uncover the absolute presuppositions of a particular type of discourse or phase in history and, in so doing, it arrives at historical facts recorded by metaphysical/ historical propositions. I present Collingwood’s account and, to further explicate it, I compare it to two other approaches which also involve, or ultimately terminate at, some kind of description of facts, Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics and Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigations. I bring out the differences between these three approaches but I also argue that their emphasis on assembling particular facts does not yield empirical but rather logical accounts which fold in historical and linguistic considerations. In Collingwood’s case, the historical dimension of his logical investigation is hermeneutical and developmental and highlights diversity.