The two selves: their metaphysical commitments and functional independence

New York: Oxford University Press (2014)
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Abstract

Introductory remarks about the problem of the self -- The epistemological self : the self of neural instantiation -- The ontological self : the self of first-person subjectivity -- The epistemological and ontological selves : a brief "summing up" -- Empirical evidence and the ontological and epistemological selves -- Some final thoughts.

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The minimal self hypothesis.Timothy Lane - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 85:103029.

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