Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? Uriah Kriegel offers an answer. His aim is a comprehensive theory of the features that all and only conscious mental events have. The key idea is that consciousness arises when self-awareness and world-awareness are integrated in the right way. Conscious mental events differ from unconscious ones in that, whatever else they may represent, they always also represent themselves, and do so in a very specific way. Subjective Consciousness is a fascinating new move forward towards a full understanding of the mind.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

2011

Call number

B808.9.S83 2009

ISBN(s)

9780199570355   9780199694709   0199694702   0199570353   9780191721625
View all bargains

Buy this book

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,197

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self-representational theory.Brie Gertler - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):447-455.
Précis of Subjective consciousness: a self-representational theory. [REVIEW]Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):443-445.
PANIC theory and the prospects for a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):55-64.
Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing themselves?: On Uriah Kriegel’s Subjective consciousness: a self-representational theory. [REVIEW]Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):467-474.
Indirect representation and the self-representational theory of consciousness.Ben Phillips - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):273-290.
Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory, by Uriah Kriegel. [REVIEW]J. Weisberg - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):538-542.
Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.) - 2006 - MIT Press.
Being all that we can be: A critical review of Thomas Metzinger's Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity.Josh Weisberg - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):89-96.
Uriah KRIEGEL,. New York: Oxford University Press 2009. 352 pp. ISBN 978-0199570355. [REVIEW]Robert Lurz - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):347-353.
Qualism.Todd Clayton Hughes - 2001 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 143--170.
Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor.Josh Weisberg - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):161-181.
Deflating consciousness: A critical review of Fred Dretske's naturalizing the mind.Paul Sheldon Davies - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):541-550.
Self‐awareness and the mind‐brain problem.Gilberto Gomes - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):155-65.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
226 (#89,990)

6 months
28 (#109,555)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Uriah Kriegel
Rice University

Citations of this work

Pure awareness experience.Brentyn J. Ramm - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):394-416.
Minimal phenomenal experience.Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-44.

View all 232 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references