Plantinga's proper function account of warrant

In J. J. Kvanvig (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman and Littlefield, Savage, Maryland (1996)
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Abstract

Plantinga thus offers an approach that begins by assessing the faculties or abilities of a cognitive system or agent. Once such an assessment is complete, the epistemologist is in a position to infer the epistemic status of the doxastic products of those faculties or abilities.

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Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Washington University in St. Louis

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