What perception is doing, and what it is not doing, in mathematical reasoning

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):205-223 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What is perception doing in mathematical reasoning? To address this question, I discuss the role of perception in geometric reasoning. Perception of the shape properties of concrete diagrams provides, I argue, a surrogate consciousness of the shape properties of the abstract geometric objects depicted in the diagrams. Some of what perception is not doing in mathematical reasoning is also discussed. I take issue with both Parsons and Maddy. Parsons claims that we perceive a certain type of abstract object. Maddy claims (at least at one time claimed) that perception provides the basis for intuition of mathematical sets. 1 Mathematical reasoning with diagrams 2 Do we perceive abstract objects? 3 Do we perceive mathematical sets?

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,928

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Conclusive reasons that we perceive sets.David MacCallum - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (1):25 – 42.
The role of diagrams in mathematical arguments.David Sherry - 2008 - Foundations of Science 14 (1-2):59-74.
Seeing sequences.David Galloway - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):93-112.
The Tinctures and Implicit Quantification over Worlds.Jay Zeman - 1997 - In Paul Forster & Jacqueline Brunning (eds.), The Rule of Reason: The Philosophy of C.S. Peirce. University of Toronto Press. pp. 96-119.
Mathematical reasoning: analogies, metaphors, and images.Lyn D. English (ed.) - 1997 - Mahwah, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
75 (#220,682)

6 months
8 (#361,341)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Image and Mind.Stephen Michael Kosslyn - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
The Logic Of Perception.Irvin Rock - 1983 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
Realism in mathematics.Penelope Maddy - 1990 - New York: Oxford University Prress.
Naturalism in mathematics.Penelope Maddy - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references