You and me

Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):289-303 (2014)
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Abstract

Are there distinctively second-personal thoughts? I clarify the question and present considerations in favour of a view on which some second-personal thoughts are distinctive. Specifically, I suggest that some second-personal thoughts are distinctive in also being first-personal thoughts. Thus, second-personal thinking provides a way of sharing another person's first-personal thoughts

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Guy Longworth
University of Warwick

Citations of this work

Observation, Interaction, Communication: The Role of the Second Person.Dan Zahavi - 2023 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 97 (1):82-103.
Epistemology Personalized.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):813-834.
First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.
Thinking About You.Léa Salje - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):817-840.

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References found in this work

Individuals.P. F. Strawson - 1959 - Garden City, N.Y.: Routledge.
Individuals.P. F. Strawson - 1959 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 14 (2):246-246.
Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects.Peter Geach - 1957 - London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.James Cargile - 1959 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 38 (2):320-323.

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