Skepticism as Nihilism : Sartre's Nausea reads Cavell
Abstract
Stanley Cavell's writings on external world skepticism (which he speaks of as “the repudiation of criteria” and "an attack on the ordinary") are profound but also widely misunderstood. Part of the reason for this is Cavell's commitment to the claim that his understanding of skepticism is continuous with that of the epistemological skepticism of Descartes, Hume and Kant. Another is the painful ambiguity of his pronouncements on the "truth" in skepticism. In this paper I argue that key passages in Sartre's 1938 novel Nausea are an expression of Cavellian skepticism, and so, provide an interpretation of it. According to this Sartre-inspired reading, Cavellian skepticism is not a form of Cartesian skepticism. Cavellian skepticism is not a matter of unanswerable doubts about our knowledge of the external world. Rather, here skepticism is nihilism, the stripping of meaning and value from the world. According to this understanding, Cavellian skepticism Is closer to the post-Kantian thought of Jacobi than to Kant; and a rethinking of the relationship between skepticism and romanticism is required.