Abstract

This article analyzes Richard Swinburne’s arguments in the problem of evil and raises new criticism and understanding regarding genocides, especially the Holocaust. Genocides are the greatest challenge for theodicies and free-will defenses, yet they are rarely addressed in the scholarship. My empirical approach questions why a loving omnipotent God permits genocides of evil. Swinburne argues that evils are necessary for good free acts, such as the creation of moral virtues. However, future goods do not justify the millions of horrific and unnecessary deaths and suffering in genocides. Swinburne’s theory that free will is so valuable that evil acts must be permitted is also very weak. Moreover, his position that God lacks foreknowledge of our free actions limits divine omniscience. Thus, Swinburne's theodicy cannot resolve the Problem of Evil and fails to justify or defend the omnipotent God. Ultimately, he relies on faith, not his arguments.