Abstract
I analyse Kripke’s modal argument against the mind-brain identity theories. Specifically, he argues
against the identity between pain and C-fibres simulation by pointing out the difference between this
identity claim and the theoretical identifications, such as ‘Water is H2O’ and ‘Lightning is a motion of
electric charges’. Kripke’s argument relies on the assumption that the experience of pains is a simple
and homogenous phenomenon, but scientific research shows that it is in fact a quite complex one. We
can distinguish at least three components: sensory-discriminative, motivational-affective and
cognitive. This discovery makes it possible to reject Kripke’s argument, but it also uncovers a major
flaw that is common to all modal arguments against physicalism. They proclaim to answer the
fundamental question about the nature of our world by relying on our powers of imagination and
without having the relevant factual knowledge.