Abstract

The doctrine of motion elaborated by Albert the Great has often been interpreted in the light of the debate, which developed in the 14th century, on the alternative between motion as a forma fluens, according to the Avicennian approach, or as a fluxus formae, more in line with Averroes’ position. Projecting this alternative onto Albert retrospectively, however, does not seem to be very productive for at least two reasons: (i) there is not a sufficient textual basis to affirm that he understood the syntagmas forma fluens / fluxus formae as indices of two different and opposing ways of interpreting physical motion; (ii) Albert actually proposes his own interpretation of motion that does not really coincide with either Avicenna’s or Averroes’. In this article, I intend to show how Albert understands motion – particularly in his Physics – as a forma fluens, but in a determinate sense, i.e. as changing according to its being and not according to its essence (secundum suum esse et non secundum suam essentiam). This qualification means that Albert’s position does not coincide in a strict sense with either Avicenna’s or Averroes’, and must instead be understood in close connection with Albert’s doctrine of incohatio formae and the presence, in matter, of a kind of ‘intellectual appetite’. My aim is thus to show how Albert found a way to inscribe the doctrine of the flow of form and the inchoative presence of forms in matter in a Neoplatonic emanationist system (mainly influenced by the Liber de causis) and to rethink the nature and function of the ‘giver of forms’ with respect to the Avicenna model.