Radically non-­ideal climate politics and the obligation to at least vote green

Environmental Values 22 (5):589-608 (2013)
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Abstract

Obligations to reduce one’s green house gas emissions appear to be difficult to justify prior to large-scale collective action because an individual’s emissions have virtually no impact on the environmental problem. However, I show that individuals’ emissions choices raise the question of whether or not they can be justified as fair use of what remains of a safe global emissions budget. This is true both before and after major mitigation efforts are in place. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to establish an obligation to reduce personal emissions because it appears unlikely that governments will in fact maintain safe emissions budgets. The result, I claim, is that under current conditions we lack outcome, fairness, promotional, virtue or duty based grounds for seeing personal emissions reductions as morally obligatory.

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Aaron Maltais
Stockholm Environment Institute

Citations of this work

Against Denialism.John Broome - 2019 - The Monist 102 (1):110-129.
Responsibility for climate justice: Political not moral.Michael Christopher Sardo - 2020 - Sage Publications: European Journal of Political Theory 22 (1):26-50.
Climate Harms.Garrett Cullity - 2019 - The Monist 102 (1):22-41.
Responsibility for climate justice: Political not moral.Michael Christopher Sardo - 2020 - European Journal of Political Theory 22 (1):26-50.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
The Ethics of Voting.Jason Brennan - 2011 - Princeton Univ Pr.

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