Breaking walls to build bridges: democracy and the struggle between belief and reason

Abstract

Public support for social policies or movements is often determined by intuitive considerations, perceived as matters of common sense. Existing theories interpret these dispositions in one of two ways: either as genetic traits inherited from hominid ancestors, or as reified elements of cultural practices. Both of these approaches imply that common sense is local and context-dependent, without any primordial components. Nevertheless, rationality cannot emerge in material environments without a set of necessary beliefs. This means that common sense incorporates universal elements as well. By treating shared factual knowledge as subjective and the basic intuitions as objective, it is possible to understand the roots of cultural paradigms and the parameters that lead to their change over time. The interplay between belief and knowledge determines the type of principles that have the strongest appeal in any society. This process works at the level of the individual, especially in the early formative years, and shapes the generational transfer of values. Of special interest is the possibility of cultural change induced by advancements in science. For example, the social relevance of scientific rationality depends on the perceived compatibility between the necessary intuitions and the supported interpretations of physical phenomena. Global effects are possible in the long run, given the universality of relevant categories. Even the modern trend towards cultural fundamentalism can be reversed, assuming favorable conditions. The goal of this dissertation is to provide a foundation for future research on the evolution of common sense. It is designed as an argument in three main steps. The first part aims to deduce the types of internal and external observables that determine the emergence of rational self-consciousness. The second part derives a limited list of physical properties that can be used to validate the ontological status of rationality. Those properties are shown to be compatible with existing empirical observations in the third part. These conclusions suggest that the progress of democracy can be influenced by future scientific developments, especially through changes in the qualitative approaches to fundamental physical interactions.

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