Abstract

The Socratic elenchus is a method of philosophical analysis which Plato largely dropped in his middle and later writings, with two exceptions, Republic 1 and the Theaetetus. But it is a mistake to describe these as elenctic dialogues, which typically seek an analysis of a virtue in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, by questioning some alleged expert about its essence. Republic 1 does not follow this pattern: Thrasymachus fundamentally objects to such a procedure and the presuppositions underlying it, while Glaucon and Socrates turn to developing their own theories of justice. The Theaetetus is likewise concerned with exploring and testing theories, in this case of knowledge. The Socratic elenchus cannot produce any philosophically interesting theories, let alone establish their truth, but at most refute them. As Plato increasingly sought out such theories, the kind of analysis at issue in the Socratic elenchus came to interest him less.