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Agency and Mental Action
Noûs 31 (s11):231-249 (1997)
Abstract
My question here is whether there are intentional mental actions that generate special, significant threats to causalism (i.e., threats of a kind not generated by intentional overt actions), or that generate, more poignantly, problems for causalism that some intentional overt actions allegedly generate, as well.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.
Doing Things with Thoughts: Brain-Computer Interfaces and Disembodied Agency.Steffen Steinert, Christoph Bublitz, Ralf Jox & Orsolya Friedrich - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (3):457-482.
Two kinds of intentions: a new defense of the Simple View.Santiago Amaya - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1767-1786.
Remembering as a mental action.Santiago Arango-Munoz & Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. Routledge. pp. 75-96.
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