Boghossian on Reductive Dispositionalism About Content: The Case Strengthened

Mind and Language 12 (1):1-10 (1997)
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Abstract

Paul Boghossian has recently argued against reductive dispositionalism concerning mental content. However, there is a powerful version of reductive dispositionalism—based on work by Ramsey and Lewis—that Boghossian does not consider. In this paper I argue that Boghossian's arguments can be adapted to apply even to this stronger version of reductionism.

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References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.
How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.
Naturalizing content.Paul Boghossian - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.

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