Cognitive Penetrability

In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this chapter I introduce the thesis that perceptual appearances are cognitively penetrable and analyse cases made against phenomenal conservatism hinging on this thesis. In particular, I focus on objections coming from the externalist reliabilist camp and the internalist inferentialist camp. I conclude that cognitive penetrability doesn’t yield lethal or substantive difficulties for phenomenal conservatism.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and Epistemic Justification.Christos Georgakakis, and & Luca Moretti - 2019 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.
Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism.Chris Tucker (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification.Susanna Siegel - 2012 - Noûs 46 (2).
On the Global Ambitions of Phenomenal Conservatism.Declan Smithies - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):206-244.
Circularity, reliability, and the cognitive penetrability of perception.Jack Lyons - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
Phenomenal conservatism and the problem of reflective awareness.Luca Moretti - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):267-280.
Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness.Luca Moretti - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):253-271.
Externalist justification and the role of seemings.Michael Bergmann - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):163-184.
Seemings and Justification: An Introduction.Chris Tucker - 2013 - In Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 1-29.
Cognitive penetration 12—16 (see also 'objections to dogmatism and/or phenomenal conservatism').Jeffrey Conditionalization - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 2--355.
Phenomenal conservatism, classical foundationalism, and internalist justification.Ali Hasan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.
Perceptual Learning Explains Two Candidates for Cognitive Penetration.Valtteri Arstila - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1151-1172.
Experience and Epistemic Structure: Can Cognitive Penetration Result in Epistemic Downgrade?Elijah Chudnoff - 2019 - In Anders Nes & Timothy Hoo Wai Chan (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. London: Routledge.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-08-19

Downloads
615 (#28,416)

6 months
137 (#26,487)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Luca Moretti
University of Aberdeen

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Compassionate phenomenal conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.

View all 45 references / Add more references