Process, Consciousness, and Integrated Information

Manuscrito 47 (1):2023-0050 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Process aspects are prevalent in many domains of reality, and consciousness is no exception. Nevertheless, while the processual approach implicitly underlies the theories of consciousness, an explicit statement of the question is scarcely found in the literature. This paper tries to bridge this gap. Here, I argue that conscious experience fulfils all the requirements for a processual analysis: it is complex, functionally/causally determined, and has a temporal basis. Then, I revisit an old concept, self-transformative processes, which refers to processes that change themselves. These processes are very common. A stretched bow is the classical Heraclitean example. However, it is easy to misunderstand what self-transformativeness is. To provide a well-formed description, I characterize self-transformative processes in terms of composition (using a non-classic mereology) and in terms of functionality (by developing the concept of self-modulating variables). Finally, I apply self-transformative processes to explain consciousness. Traces of self-transformativeness can be found in many theories of consciousness, particularly when they are stressed about their internal mechanisms. Here, I focus on Integrated Information Theory as a paradigmatic example of a mathematically well-described theory, and I demonstrate that quantitative self-transformativeness is a requirement at the very core of the integration of the information.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,654

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness.Fallon Francis - 2016 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Does Integrated Information Lack Subjectivity.Janko Nešić - 2018 - Theoria: Beograd 61 (2):131-145.
Two Objections to the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness.A. O. Sovik - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):186-201.
The Problem with the 'Information' in Integrated Information Theory.Garrett Mindt - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (7-8):130-154.
Taking Time Seriously in Tononi's Integrated Information Theory.T. Hunt - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):88-110.
Of integrated information theory: a philosophical evaluation.Haoying Liu - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (3):442-468.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-02-06

Downloads
10 (#1,210,980)

6 months
10 (#299,297)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.

View all 26 references / Add more references