Critical Analysis of the Reliability of Intuitive Moral Decisions

Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research 11:7-15 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Purpose of the research is a critical analysis of the reliability of intuitive moral decisions. Methodology. The work is based on the methodological attitude of empirical ethics, involving the use of findings from empirical research in ethical reflection and decision making. Originality. The main kinds of intuitive moral decisions are identified: 1) intuitively emotional decisions (i.e. decisions made under the influence of emotions that accompanies the process of moral decision making); 2) decisions made under the influence of moral risky psychological aptitudes (unconscious human tendencies that makes us think in a certain way and make decisions, unacceptable from the logical and ethical point of view); 3) intuitively normative decisions (decisions made under the influence of socially learned norms, that cause evaluative feeling «good-bad», without conscious reasoning). It was found that all of these kinds of intuitive moral decisions can lead to mistakes in the moral life. Conclusions. Considering the fact that intuition systematically leads to erroneous moral decisions, intuitive reaction cannot be the only source for making such decisions. The conscious rational reasoning can compensate for weaknesses of intuition. In this case, there is a necessity in theoretical model that would structure the knowledge about the interactions between intuitive and rational factors in moral decisions making and became the basis for making suggestions that would help us to make the right moral decision.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,497

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Intuitive Methods of Moral Decision Making, A Philosophical Plea.Emilian Mihailov - 2013 - In Muresan Valentin & Majima Shunzo (eds.), Applied Ethics: Perspectives from Romania. Center for Applied Ethics and Philosophy, Hokkaido University. pp. 62-78.
Meta-Reasoning in Making Moral Decisions Under Normative Uncertainty.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2016 - In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński (eds.), Argumentation and Reasoned Action. College Publications. pp. 1093-1104.
Moral Intuitions, Moral Expertise and Moral Reasoning1.Albert W. Musschenga - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4):597-613.
Moral intuitions, moral expertise and moral reasoning.Albert W. Musschenga - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4):597-613.
The Ethical Mind: An Outline.Zdravko Radman - 2006 - Synthesis Philosophica 21 (2):385-394.
Good Moral Judgment and Decision‐Making Without Deliberation.Asia Ferrin - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):68-95.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-10-10

Downloads
8 (#1,325,033)

6 months
5 (#649,144)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Emotions and reasoning in moral decision making.V. V. Nadurak - 2016 - Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research 10:24-32.
Emotions and reasoning in the moral decision making.V. V. Nadurak - 2016 - Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research 10:24-32.

Add more references