Perception is not all-purpose

Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):4069-4080 (2021)
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Abstract

I aim to show that perception depends counterfactually on the action we want to perform. Perception is not all-purpose: what we want to do does influence what we see. After clarifying how this claim is different from the one at stake in the cognitive penetrability debate and what counterfactual dependence means in my claim, I will give a two-step argument: one’s perceptual attention depends counterfactually on one’s intention to perform an action and one’s perceptual processing depends counterfactually on one’s perceptual attention. If we put these claims together, what we get is that one’s perceptual processing depends counterfactually on one’s intention to perform an action.

Similar books and articles

Perceptual Representation / Perceptual Content.Bence Nanay - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press. pp. 153-167.
Representing the impossible.Jennifer Matey - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):188 - 206.

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Author's Profile

Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp

References found in this work

Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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