The Scope of Contingency

In Theism and Ultimate Explanation. Oxford: A John Wiley & Sons. pp. 111–129 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter considers a provisional hypothesis that Logos is indeed absolutely perfect – in a word, God – and then discusses the implications of this assumption for the scope of contingency. It then argues that if God exists, it is likely that contingent reality is vastly greater than what current scientific theory or even speculation fancies. The conditions for freedom in the divine and human cases differ in a way that reflects the difference in ontological status between an absolutely independent Creator and a dependent, causally conditioned creature. The chapter also discusses some applications of the many‐universe‐creation hypothesis. Finally, it addresses the relationship of Logos to logical and mathematical necessities.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,261

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Foundational Grounding and the Argument from Contingency.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 8.
Contingency, Imperfection and Evil.Saša Stanković - 2017 - Quaestiones Disputatae 7 (2):50-71.
Absence of contingency in the Newtonian universe.James W. McAllister - 2004 - Foundations of Science 9 (2):191-210.
Historical Necessity and Contingency.Yemima Ben-Menahem - 2008 - In Aviezer Tucker (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 120–130.
Cosmological and Ontological Contingency.Robert Cummings Neville - 2019 - American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 40 (1):54-56.
The Topography of Historical Contingency.Rob Inkpen & Derek Turner - 2012 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (1):1-19.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-15

Downloads
4 (#1,628,455)

6 months
1 (#1,478,781)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references