Against representationalism

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (3):324-347 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is very natural to suppose that conscious sensory experience is essentially representational. However this thought gives rise to any number of philosophical problems and confusions. I shall argue that it is quite mistaken. Conscious phenomena cannot be constructed out of representational materials.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1080/09672559.2016.1175102

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Self-representationalism and phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.
Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
The Way Ripe Tomatoes Look: An Argument Against Externalist Representationalism.Max Deutsch - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (3):297-316.
The Phenomenal Character of Visual Consciousness.Robert Schroer - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago
Perceptual experience, conscious content, and nonconceptual content.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.
Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology.Michael K. Shim - 2011 - Husserl Studies 27 (3):197-215.
Representationalism about consciousness.William E. Seager & David Bourget - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 261-276.
Ambiguous figures and the spatial contents of perceptual experience: a defense of representationalism.René Jagnow - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):325-346.
Is feeling pain the perception of something?Murat Aydede - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567.
Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character.Fiona Macpherson - 2000 - Dissertation, University of Stirling
Qualia and the Representational Theory of Phenomenal Character.Tim Klaassen - manuscript
Affect: Representationalists' Headache.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198.
Can Tracking Representationalism Make Sense of Synesthesia?Casey Landers - unknown
Representationalism and the scene-immediacy of visual experience: A journey to the fringe and back.Robert Schroer - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):595-615.
Representationalism, supervenience, and the cross-modal problem.John W. O’dea - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):285-95.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-05-21

Downloads
239 (#85,311)

6 months
19 (#137,170)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Papineau
King's College London

Citations of this work

The significance argument for the irreducibility of consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):349-407.
How Does Colour Experience Represent the World?Adam Pautz - 2021 - In Derek H. Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. New York: Routledge.
What Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness?Adam Pautz - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):1-2.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.

View all 41 references / Add more references