School-Based Data Teams Ask the Darnedest Questions About Statistics: Three Essays in the Epistemology of Statistical Consulting and Teaching

Abstract

The essays in this thesis attempt to answer the most difficult questions that I have faced as a teacher and consultant for school-based data teams. When we report statistics to our fellow educators, what do we say and what do we leave unsaid? What do averages mean when no student is average? Why do we treat our population of students as infinite when we test for statistical significance? I treat these as important philosophical questions. In the first essay, I use Paul Grice’s philosophical analysis of conversational logic to understand how data teams can accidentally mislead with true statistics, and I use Bernard Williams’s philosophical analysis of truthfulness to understand the value, for data teams, of not misleading with statistics. In short, statistical reports can be misleading when they violate the Gricean maxims of conversation. I argue that, for data teams, adhering to the Gricean maxims is an intrinsic value, alongside Williams’s intrinsic values of Sincerity and Accuracy. I conclude with some recommendations for school-based data teams. In the second essay, I build on Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin’s analyses of exemplification to argue that averages are attenuated, moderate, and sometimes fictive exemplars. As such, medians and means lend themselves to scientific objectivity. In the third essay, I use Goodman’s theory of counterfactuals and Carl Hempel’s theory of explanation to articulate why data teams should make statistical inferences to infinite populations that include possible but not actual students. Data teams are generally concerned that their results are explainable by random chance. Random chance, as an explanation, implies lawlike generalizations, which in turn imply counterfactual claims about possible but not actual subjects. By statistically inferring to an infinite population of students, data teams can evaluate those counterfactual claims in order to assess the plausibility of random chance as an explanation for their findings.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Interpreting research results of parish mystagogy.Patrick Cronin - 2013 - The Australasian Catholic Record 90 (1):71.
‘‘Describing our whole experience’’: The statistical philosophies of W. F. R. Weldon and Karl Pearson.Charles H. Pence - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 (4):475-485.
Who has scientific knowledge?K. Brad Wray - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):337 – 347.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-11-17

Downloads
15 (#950,500)

6 months
1 (#1,475,915)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references