Stanowisko epistemologiczne Alvina Plantingi w sporze o naturę, funkcję i wartość uprawnienia epistemicznego / Alvin Plantinga’s Position in Epistemological Debate about the Nature, Function and the Value of the Epistemic Warrant

Filo-Sofija 41 (2):73-92 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article presents Alvin Plantinga’s views on epistemic justification. The first part situates Plantinga’s epistemological views in the context of his epistemology of religion and debates of general epistemology. The second part discusses Plantinga’s argument that the internalism of 20th century epistemology stems from deontologism and that the views on the epistemic justification of analytic philosophers reflect the relationship between classical deontologism and classical internalism. The last part points to the objections with which the Plantinga’s conception met and tries to balance the depth and weakness of its position.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Proper Function and the Conditions for Warrant.Mark J. Boone - 2012 - Philosophia Christi 14 (2):373-386.
Warrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Warrant and analysis.Joel Pust - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):51–57.
Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Alvin Plantinga.Deane-Peter Baker (ed.) - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Apologetical Implications of Alvin Plantinga's Epistemology.K. Scott Oliphint - 1994 - Dissertation, Westminster Theological Seminary
Counterfactuals and Epistemic Probability.R. Otte - 2006 - Synthese 152 (1):81-93.
Reliabilism, proper function, and serendipitous malfunction.Adrian Bardon - 2006 - Philosophical Investigations 30 (1):45–64.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-07-25

Downloads
265 (#77,346)

6 months
55 (#84,404)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations