Abstract

This paper will, to a large extent, be concerned with the meatontological position of David Chalmers. Chapters 1, 2, and 4 will respectively present Chalmers’ terminology, his argument based on a thought experiment and his classification of metaontological positions. In chapter 3 attempt will be made to show that there are some unjustified steps in Chalmers’ argumentation, because the conclusion that egzistential ontological claims are not supstantive is built into the definitions of the terms he uses. Chapter 5 will present some of Chalmers’ arguments against ontological realism, and it will be shown that they are not successful, or only partialy successful. In chapter 6 attempt will be made to show that opposed metaphysical claims lie at the heart of the disputes between opposed metaontological positions, at least as they are presented by Chalmers. The main purpose of this paper will be to explicate the role of some metaphysical assupmtions in metaontological analysis of David Chalmers.