The More Evidence Heuristic

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5 (6):27-41 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

If A confirms H and B confirms H, it seems reasonable to infer that A&B confirms H. However, this inference is not valid; it is only a heuristic. I show that the level of confirmation A and B each give to H by itself implies nothing about the level of confirmation that A&B gives to H. Any combination of values is possible for P(H), P(H|A), P(H|B) and P(H|AB) is possible. Still, I show the heuristic leads from true premises to true conclusions whenever A and B are statistically independent or correlated,which includes most situations where we evaluate evidence. There is risk, though, when one does not consider how A and B interact; one can miss anti-correlations that lead the heuristic to fail. The problem is exacerbated when groups of people are motivated to support a favored hypothesis. Each person finds evidence that confirms the hypothesis and contributes that evidence to the group’s discourse (e.g. through a climate change denial website). The temptation to focus solely on the number of individual pieces of evidence can lead people to ignore whether the evidence fits together. In combination with cognitive biases, this can lead to serious errors.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Fast and Frugal Heuristics.Michael A. Bishop - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):201–223.
Poor People of the World Unite! Poverty and the Future of Research in Heuristics.María G. Navarro - 2014 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3 (2):19-21.
Vague heuristics.María G. Navarro - 2015 - In Settimo Termini and Rudolf Seising Claudio Moraga (ed.), Conjectures, Hypotheses, and Fuzzy Logic. Springer. pp. 281-294.
Evidence of Evidence as Higher Order Evidence.Anna-Maria A. Eder & Peter Brössel - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-83.
Hindsight bias is not a bias.Brian Hedden - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):43-52.
Are empirical evidence claims a priori?Peter Achinstein - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):447-473.
Automated choice heuristics.Shane Frederick - 2002 - In . Cambridge University Press. pp. 548-558.
What is Evidence of Evidence Evidence of?Fabio Lampert & John Biro - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (2):195-206.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-02-03

Downloads
68 (#241,044)

6 months
68 (#71,909)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Benjamin T. Rancourt
North Carolina State University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The best explanation: Criteria for theory choice.Paul R. Thagard - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):76-92.
Of conspiracy theories.Brian Keeley - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):109-126.
Why heuristics work.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2008 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 3 (1):20-29.
Miraculous consilience of quantum mechanics.Malcolm R. Forster - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. pp. 201--228.
Confirmation for a modest realism.Laura J. Snyder - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):839-849.

Add more references