On Coherence as a Formal Property of Normative Systems

Revus 27 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper deals with the notions of consistency, completeness, and coherence within the normative domain. It investigates their mutual relations by singling out relative and absolute consistency, weak, strong and trivial completeness, and three different functions of coherence. The main upshot of the inquiry is that coherence may be regarded as a complex combination of weak completeness and possible absence of consistency and strong completeness of a system of rules regarding a non-trivially complete/non-absolutely inconsistent system of underlying principles

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,227

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Inconsistency: The coherence theorist’s nemesis?Mylan Engel - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1):113-130.
A Graded Bayesian Coherence Notion.Frederik Herzberg - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):843-869.
De Finetti Coherence and Logical Consistency.James M. Dickey, Morris L. Eaton & William D. Sudderth - 2009 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (2):133-139.
Moral Coherence and Principle Pluralism.Patricia Marino - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (6):727-749.
On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence.William Roche - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):647-665.
Formal models of coherence and legal epistemology.Amalia Amaya - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):429-447.
Frege and Gödel: Two Fundamental Texts in Mathematical Logic.Jean Van Heijenoort - 1970 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Gottlob Frege & Kurt Gödel.
Probability and Human Rationality.Lyle David Zynda - 1995 - Dissertation, Princeton University
Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?Niko Kolodny - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):437-463.
Coherentism.Peter Murphy - 2006 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-08-21

Downloads
56 (#287,207)

6 months
8 (#370,225)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations