Is the Enkratic Principle a Requirement of Rationality?

Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):436-462 (2013)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that the enkratic principle in its classic formulation may not be a requirement of rationality. The investigation of whether it is leads to some important methodological insights into the study of rationality. I also consider the possibility that we should consider rational requirements as a subset of a broader category of agential requirements.

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Andrew Reisner
Uppsala University

Citations of this work

Metanormative regress: an escape plan.Christian Tarsney - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5).
Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):170-194.
The Real Myth of Coherence.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1211-1230.
What is Structural Rationality?Wooram Lee - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):614-636.

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References found in this work

Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
The domain of reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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