LOT, CTM, and the Elephant in the Room

Synthese 170 (2):235 - 250 (2009)
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Abstract

According to the language of thought (LOT) approach and the related computational theory of mind (CTM), thinking is the processing of symbols in an inner mental language that is distinct from any public language. Herein, I explore a deep problem at the heart of the LOT/CTM program—it has yet to provide a plausible conception of a mental symbol

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Susan Schneider
Florida Atlantic University

Citations of this work

The nature of symbols in the language of thought.Susan Schneider - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (5):523-553.
The Commitment to LOT.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (2):313-341.
Informational Semantics and Frege Cases.Matthew Rellihan - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (3):267-294.

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References found in this work

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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